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If you want to understand the causes that
existed in the past, look at the results as
they are manifested in the present. And if you
want to understand what results will be
manifested in the future, look at the causes
that exist in the present.
- Buddhist Sutra
1 COMMODITY AID, COUNTERPART FUNDS
AND MACROECONOMICS
In the 1980s, food and other commodity aid, their
monetisation, counterpart funds and macroeconomic
policy have become prominent in applied analytical
and applied policy dialogue and practice in sub-
Saharan Africa (S SA) for quite specific contextual
reasons.
First, twenty-five years of low growth of food
production, falls in earned import capacity,
deterioration of infrastructure and war have created
growing malnutrition and vulnerability to famine in
most of SSA. Upsurges of drought and war in the first
half of the 1980s triggered massive food aid, both for
destitute refugees and for urban populations who did
not lack purchasing power so much as physical access to
food.
At the same time, the perceived need for quick
disbursing assistance to halt the throttling of
infrastructure maintenance and of directly productive
sectors by import strangulation operation led to
balance of payments support funding. Like much food
aid, this was in large part sold to enterprise resulting in
flows of counterpart domestic currency.
All this ran in parallel with the concern of external
assistance providers in the 1980s that wrong
macroeconomic policies in Africa (usually perceived as
excessive interference with markets and inadequate
presence of good governance) were the chief cause of its
economic decline. That concern in turn led to rising
determination to utilise external transfers as a means to
influence or control recipient state policy and practice
- especially macroeconomic policy and government
accounting (see Green 199 lb). The domestic currency
counterpart flows were seen as an effective and
available instrument for utilizing food and other
commodity aid to alter recipient government allocations
of, and accounting for, resources.
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In practice, counterpart funds were large relative to
state spending in only a minority of cases and for a few
suppliers, so that the potential leverage tended to be
overestimated (see Bruton and Hill 1991). And because
donor policies and accounting frames were both in flux
and divergent, largely relating to a shift from the old
'capital budget aid - good; recurrent budget support
- bad' dichotomy to a more analytical and contextual
one; the pressures on recipients were inconsistent. At a
high opportunity price in scarce personnel time, the
divergencies meant they were also evadable/avoidable.
This confused situation was made even less coherent by
the traditional view that food aid should both feed the
hungry directly today and if monetised (traditionally
frowned upon) tomorrow as well, via use of counterpart
funded rural investment and the new Human
Condition/Adjustment With A Human Face/Absolute
Poverty Reduction focus (see Green 1991a; World
Bank 1989; World Bank 1990).
As is distressingly common in development theory,
analysis and praxis, the new attention to food
aid/counterpart funds has not been informed signi-
ficantly by the earlier experience of the 1 950s and I 960s
(see FAO 1955; Dandekar 1965). Historical memory
both institutional and academic - has proven to be
both fragmentary and occasional.
2 MACRO ECONOMIC ANALYTICAL
FRAMEWORK
The commodity aid/counterpart fund official and
quasi-official analysis has reached a certain consensus
(Maxwell 1991 and in this Bulletin). There is agreement
that, in general, the combination of commodity
transfers, monetisation and first round expenditure is
inherently neutral as to government budget balance,
household/enterprise account and - less clearly -
balance of payments. This assumes a rapid completion
of counterpart fund disbursement (see Clement 1989;
Roemer 1989).
In fact, this conclusion is not a general result, but one
contextually related to SSA in the l980s and probably
in the 1990s. Import constraints cripple production
and revenue constraints choke off even services that all
commentators agree are both crucial and state business.
Therefore, commodity transfers do raise imports and
utilized counterpart funds increase government
spending by virtually their own amount.
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However, that is really a first round analysis of
monetary GDP at current prices. If increased
government spending, balanced by commodity aid
receipts, allows provision of more services, there will be
a balanced budget multiplier (increase in real GDP).
To the extent real public sector wages are raised, the
balanced budget multiplier will be reduced unless
higher real wages are offset by productivity gains.
Given the below efficiency level wage/salary structure
of many SSA states, such a rise in real wages or fall in
unit labour cost of services is by no means implausible.
The assumptions behind the consensus assume a brief
time lag from effective real resource transfer (aid eaten
or put into a production process) and counterpart fund
expenditure. Most monetisation and fund use
procedures do not, in fact, result in brief lags. Longer
lags make resource transfer/monetisation deflationary
(households/enterprises pay; government does not
spend) and lagged spending inflationary (government
spending rises at a time real resource supply is not
raised). The neutral result can then be obtained when
disbursements (out of previous sale proceeds)
approximate extractions (from sale of current aid)
(Roemer 1989).
Further, there are sectoral specifications which modify
the macro results. Neither by product nor by region are
extractions (enterprise/household payments reducing
demand) likely to correspond exactly to injections
(government spending), rather than be above or below
(Maxwell 1991). Further, construction demand is
likely to rise and to be inflationary given that sector's
characteristics.
More serious, the consensus concentrates on first
round effects - not continued impact over time. This
is particularly relevant in respect to GDP and the
balance of payments. Post first round spending should
raise GDP. But that will inevitably raise import
requirements (as indeed will balanced initial round
additional government spending, albeit that could be
balanced by commodity aid for state import
requirements, e.g. drugs, textbooks, vehicles and
spares, fuel). As a result, the macroeconomic consensus
is narrow and short term in outlook; not at all the ideal
basis for using commodity aid and counterpart funds as
an input into structural adjustment's medium term,
real output enhancement strategy.
This limitation is inherent in slow disbursing
counterpart funds but applies more generally to all
such funds not large enough relative to total recipient
spending to allow serious forward macro or sectoral
impact analysis or to limit fungibility (switching other
resources away from use funded through monetised
commodity aid). They are exacerbated if the
commodity flow is variable and unpredictable in
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amount and timing - as is most food aid and some
other CA.
To overcome these limitations requires analysis and
allocation in a genuinely national macroeconomic and
articulated sectoral perspective, with clear attention to
policies as well as spending. Further, if commodity aid
is highly variable, then it needs to be evaluated and
assessed in conjunction with other types of resource
transfer.
Whether these conditions suggest streamlined, more
broadly focused, coordinated counterpart funds, or an
overall dialogue on resource use with the proceeds of
monetised commodity assistance flowing directly into
general revenue, is an open question. Assuming a
reasonable degree of effective governance and
accountability on the part of the recipient state, the
latter goal - in effect ending counterpart funds as a
means of channelling counterpart receipt flows -
would appear desirable.
However, some recipient states are not noted for
accountability or good governance and some donors
perceive themselves as having vested interests in
controlling (or appearing to control) the uses of funds
derived from the sale of their grant or soft loan
assistance. In such cases, a conflict is likely to exist
between effective control and assisting in capacitating
the recipient state. Tight limits on spending, externally
designed rules on monetisation procedures, substantial
expatriate involvement in all stages of transfer-
monetisation-spending, and preparing special accounts
to a format quite different from the basic national
budgetary one, all marginalize and fragment the
recipient and reduce its capacity for good governance.
Despite these potential contradictions, there are a
number of areas on which operational reform of the
counterpart fund process and of overall dialogue
leading to practice on spending should be both
attainable and attained. Further, that process would
help clarify more basic issues and, perhaps, thereby
facilitate their longer term resolution (cf. e.g. Riley
1990).
3 MACRO TO CF: SOME LINKS AND ISSUES
3.1 The initial CF question is generation. This
requires either specific (e.g. food) or generalized
(e.g. import support) commodity transfers
which are made to a recipient state which
monetises them by sales to enterprises or
households. To be an efficient component in
meeting import capacity requirements all
commodity aid needs to be in the framework of
broadly agreed financial and commodity
requirements. Similarly, CF levels - as a whole
- should be related to an agreed estimate of
government financing needs to provide broadly
agreed levels of services. In practice, not all
resource transfers are CA nor are most
government receipts from CFs (under 5 per cent
in most cases albeit 15 per cent to 25 per cent in a
few) so that the exercise is both difficult and, at
specific CA/CF level, inherently requiring
flexibility and, therefore, at risk from fungibility
(or made efficient by fungibility if one assumes
the recipient has sensible import and
expenditure priorities and procedures !).
3.2 Monetisation is necessary for CFs (albeit not
for CA directed to government e.g.
pharmaceuticals - or final beneficiary e.g.
potential famine victim - use). It is also
necessary for efficiency and cost control in
distribution, sustaining or enhancing the
domestic marketing system and providing a
framework within which to provide positive
incentives to domestic production.
For food aid, the usual logical pattern is sale of
physical food in urban areas with the proceeds
used to buy domestically as near vulnerable
populations as possible. Indeed, if domestic
markets are in working order, paying wages to
recipients to buy food (if necessarily partly
supplied by food aid) makes better sense than
traditional food for work (cf. World Bank/WFP
1990; Green 1986).
3.3 Collection and release of CF revenues are
integral to avoiding deflationary/inflationary
sequences from lags, as well as to the allocation of
domestic state expenditure provided for under
the CF agreement being effective. The lags
result from the state being the de facto working
capital supplier to wholesalers, manufacturers
and retailers (public or private sector) buying the
goods. IMF credit ceilings set with no real
attention to working capital requirements,
government sloth in collection and purchaser
desire for interest free, extended credit
contribute to that result.
If possible, the state should sell to wholesalers
for cash with the wholesalers using commercial
bank credit to pay and repeating the process
vis-à-vis retailers. If this is not practicable, then
credit periods (say 60 days) for wholesalers
should be set by the state selling unit and
analogous ones (say 30 days average) by
wholesalers to retailers. Given off-loading/sale
to wholesaler time that implies 120 days from CA
arrival to CF receipts.
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34 The public/private issue need not be central
on the recipient side. In terms of physical use,
monetised commodity aid is used by the private
sector. Retailing usually, and wholesaling
sometimes, is by private sector enterprises. The
CF revenue utilization by the state is - or can be
perfectly consistent with providing human
investment, basic services and safety nets,
physical infrastructure and enabling policies
which stimulate enterprise and household
initiatives and production growth (cf. World
Bank 1989).
The donor side has a more integral - and
distorting public sector involvement. Much
commodity aid (food, fertiliser and some import
support) is enmeshed in national production
support and support cost minimization (or
transfer to another budget head, such as aid).
The lack of attention to normal contractual
provisions safeguarding the recipients (as to
suitability, quality, arrival date, loss en route) are
a function of donor bureaucracy which would
not apply were the recipient free to buy from a
low cost source and secure a normal commercial
contract.
Commodity aid can also seriously damage third
party (often Southern) potential suppliers who
cannot afford to provide soft loans or grants.
This can be offset by triangular transactions (e.g.
EEC, Netherlands, USA and Australia's grain
purchases in Zimbabwe for Southern African
food deficit states) but that remains the
exception not the rule (as Australia, Thailand
and Argentina have repeatedly pointed out with
limited results).
Positively, public sector involvement is needed if
'fair' (breakeven but below scarcity or imperfect
market) prices or selectively subsidised (e.g.
inferior staple) prices are desired. Payment has
to be by the donor or recipient public sector and
distribution via a monitored (albeit quite
possibly private) selling structure. In practice a
CF may be a useful means to finance such a
subsidy (billing the CA at commercial cost and
then financing the agreed subsidy expenditure as
back to back transactions in a way beneficial to
transparency and accountability with minimal
personnel or procedural cost).
3.5 Valuation should be at commercial border price
for low cost sources and routes which may not
be the book value as seen by the donor. Any other
valuation is inherently distorting. However, that
assumes a plausible exchange rate. CA/CF
negotiations are a very poor forum for setting
exchange rates, but severe over-valuation does
reduce CF purchasing power and provides an
implicit subsidy to the CA users which may or
may flot be desirable, depending on who they
are.
3.6 But CF receipts are not the only price issue
relevant to CA/CF. If a 'fair' or 'free market'
price interacts with domestic security, transport
and/or production problems to create a ruinous
domestic grower price, then food aid (or other
commodity aid by analogy) may act as a
disincentive and distort production structures.
Using CF (or other) funding to offset abnormal
costs, to bolster producer prices in the short run,
and to invest in cost reducing means to remove
the distortion in the medium, is a possible
approach. It is worth noting that this distortion
effect is particularly likely if exchange rates are
severely over-valued and the commodity pro-
vided is a close substitute for a different domestic
one (e.g. wheat for sorghum and millet in the
Sudan and Somalia). The cost reduction use of
CF is an example of the need to view producer
incentives more broadly than a unique focus on
prices - costs and ability to respond to prices
also matter, for SSA food producers usually
more than prices taken in isolation.
3.7 CF use need not in macroeconomic logic have
any relationship to the commodity providing
the domestic currency flow and still less to
projects or programmes whose import costs are
financed by the particular CA donor. However,
in practice some links may be psychologically or
politically useful. Two examples are, first, the
use of CF (especially from food aid) to increase
entitlements of absolutely poor households by
funding extension of basic services and,
secondly, holistic support packages with project
- technical assistance - domestic currency
(from CF) components.
3.8 Accounting and reporting are essential to
accountability in both the narrow and the broad
senses and for both providers and recipients. In
principle, they should be an integral part of a
coherent recipient government accounting and
reporting system, with any alterations to other
formats made by the donors. In practice, donors
insist on reports in their own, very diverse,
formats and make limited progress in trying to
coordinate among themselves, still less with
recipient systems (cf. Riley 1990; Riley et al
1990). Many recipient accounting/reporting
systems are ill-designed and/or inadequately
operated. The hauling out of portions of
accounts and reports in separate systems to
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satisfy (or fail to satisfy) donors has the result of
further enfeebling and decapacitating the overall
national system to which they should relate.
3.9 Coordination goes beyond accounting.
Logically it means integrating CA provision and
CF utilization into an agreed medium term
macro and sectoral economic strategy with
rolling budget on both the external and fiscal
sides. That implies the dialogue should be
around the national import and government
expenditure budgets and the policies underlying
them. In practice this rarely happens - at least
explicitly. Donor coordination tends to focus on
increasing ease of CF operation and effectiveness
of CF policy leverage as perceived by them.
Consultative Groups rarely handle CA in any
detail and tend to focus on PFP (priority public
investment finance programme), not foreign
exchange and fiscal budgets.
3.10 NGOs have become a factor in CF discussion
because they are a current fashion, are
sometimes financed by CFs and have CF
relationships which tend to hamper most
streamlining and coordination proposals. In
practice, the discussion has turned on external
NGOs, whereas logic would suggest CF
allocations should be to domestic NGOs. In
either case coherence and accountability suggest
that transfers to NGOs should go via the CF to
the domestic government budget and thence to
the NGOs and that the level of allocations to
them should be negotiated in the same way as of
those to, e.g. basic health services, rural public
works, primary education or agricultural
extension.
4 TOWARD IMPROVED CA/CF USE
Proposals for CA/CF impovement are necessarily
general if written at the level of CA to and CFs in S SA.
In any particular case, some variations are likely to be
necessary and/or appropriate.
One fairly general set of exceptions exists in respect of
donors for whom and countries to which commodity
aid is a small proportion of total recipient fiscal
operations. In these cases, the administrative nuisances
and institutional time opportunity costs of running
CFs are large enough relative to gains that allowing CA
monetisation proceeds to go direct to general revenue
would appear optimal, with the most plausible
alternative being direction of all CF type receipts to
NGO programme support.
A second exception concerns donors who are now
willing to have CA (and Import Support) proceeds go
to general revenue after an overall dialogue on
budgetary priorities and specific concerns within them.
In these cases there is no very evident reason why they
should set up 'their' or join in 'joint' CFs. Their
perception that CFs do not in fact add to leverage in any
way not better facilitated by dialogue is arguably
correct, as has been pointed out forcefully in a recent
consultant's report to the EEC (Goreux 1990). This
view is, perhaps paradoxically, shared by the IMF for
countries with which it has Programmes (see Clement
1989 and in this Bulletin) and would probably be
supported by many World Bank officials in respect to at
least some SAP/Consultative Group countries.
Certainly the arguments of the Long Term Perspective
Study (World Bank 1989) for backing ongoing country
initiatives, not designing new conditional programmes
externally, points in that direction.
The first main guideline for better CA/CF use is to
start from nationally proposed, and subsequently
agreed in dialogue with donors, foreign exchange
and government source and uses budgets,
covering combined import support, investment and
emergency heads on the external side and recurrent,
capital and emergency (or calamity) on the government
side.
From that base a real resource transfer and a real
augmentation of government revenue target can
be derived. At that point it is appropriate to identify
commodities available for CF purposes which are
needed in the recipient and not available domestically
which could be supplied by CA in addition (or largely
in addition) to financial transfers and which would not
cost substantially more on CA terms than the financial
counterpart of low cost source commercial purchases.
The main commodities in this cluster are likely to be
maize, wheat, rice, vegetable oil, sugar and milk
powder, albeit, for specific countries at specific times,
other standardized commodities (including fertilisers,
newsprint, textbooks papers and pharmaceuticals) may
also figure.
To the extent the commodities are not for direct
government or refugee/disaster victim consumption, a
strong case exists for monetisation (see World
Bank/World Food Programme 1991). In that case the
proceeds become part of the resources available for
meeting the augmentation of government revenue
target. Assuming that the overall foreign exchange
requirements have been estimated with reasonable
accuracy, they can be expended on government
domestic purposes without directly or indirectly
unbalancing the external accounts. Bringing CA direct
I Food import needs in 2000 on relatively optimistic output trend
estimates are over 30 million tonnes. If food aid is to be a constant
share it will need to rise to over 12.5 million tonnes. Achieving peace
in the Horn and Southern Africa, speedily followed by rapid
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to project or programme on budget involves only
nominal monetisation, e.g. back to back cheques from
Finance to Health and Health to Finance for donated
drugs. Its value is in providing accountability - an
intelligible, complete picture of sources and uses both
ex ante and ex post.
This exercise should end with a set of foreign
exchange/external resource commitments equal
to the pre-exercise external gap, and with a set of
commitments to government revenue equal to the
pre-exercise government funding gap. These will not
necessarily be the same sum; indeed they will not be
unless all external grants and loans to enterprises/
households are put through the budget which is rather
unlikely.
Because the exercise has some aspects of a jigsaw
puzzle, it needs for efficiency's sake to be done at one
place and time, with as few details and loose pieces as
possible needing to be followed up later. This implies
the locus should be at an annual Consultative
Group/Forum meeting of the recipient with its
external cooperating partners. The central working
documents (external and governmental budgets), and
their back-up studies of programmes and projects plus
the overall strategy paper informing them, should be
presented by the recipient. No other entry point is
capable of generating a full capacitating process, nor of
making the government feel the agreed programmes
belong to it.
In the SSA context, these guidelines would be
consistent with substantially more food1 aid and
balance of payments support transfers. However, that
is likely to be efficient only if food aid is billed for CF
purposes at low cost commercial source c.i.f. price; if
balance of payments support is freely usable on
whatever exports from the donor are actually
competitive (or better still is untied); and if triangular
food aid is expanded and made standard practice in
respect to buying from maize and sorghum/millet
surplus countries with a view to establishing
subsequent commercial intra-African grain trading
and physical food security interaction.
CFs should receive the c.i.f. commercial price value of
monetised CA promptly. It should then flow into the
budgetary process - to pre-agreed users -
automatially. That requires an annual estimation
exercise (including unused balances and desired end of
year balances to provide a cushion against sharp, short
term instability in transfers), not budgeting past
livelihood rehabilitation, might reduce this target to 11 million
tonnes a year versus 5 million actual average 1984/89 food aid
deliveries. (See Green 1991:31, and sources cited there for greater
detail.)
receipts which enforces an 18 month lag from sale to
release.
CA/CF programming should be set up to minimize
unintended distortions, consistent with meeting
resource allocation and human condition targets.2
Nationally, this does not rule out 'fair price' systems or
self-targeting (e.g. 'inferior staple') subsidies, nor
financing safety net income transfers from CFs, but
does warn against pricing and procurement which
disable domestic markets and de-incentivate domestic
producers. Globally, it implies third country procure-
ment, whenever this is the least cost source, and some
margin above that for enabling the build-up of
sustainable regional trade in food and food security
programming.
CF use should be in the context of overall
project/programme requirements to attain
strategic aims. Any agreed domestic currency cost
head may be suitable. Both psychological/symbolic
and convenience/technical efficiency reasons do
suggest some packaging may be useful, e.g. of food aid
and rural development or of CF, and perhaps CA, with
financial transfers from a single donor to a single
project or programme.
The purposes of accounting and reporting are to
ensure comprehensive transparency and account-
ability (in the broader sense). Proper budgetary
processes at analytical, formulation, allocation, funding,
disbursement, monitoring and evaluation turn on
adequate, timely accounting and reporting (on real as
well as financial out-turn with divergences from targets
explained).
In many SSA countries, to achieve these standards
requires alteration or broadening of present systems.
For example, it should be possible to determine rapidly
at national, provincial and - for most programmes,
e.g. primary health care, road maintenance - for what
the physical as well as the financial performance was
targeted to be and is. With computerized systems, this
type of multiple pattern retrieval is simple if the initial
entry forms are properly devised. In virtually all SSA
countries, more trained personnel and better equipment
are needed to operate such systems. Both training/
equipping and system improvement are logically
mutual recipient/cooperating partner concerns and
training at least is a logical CF allocation area.
CF reporting should provide data by programme,
project and geographic unit (at least to province and
2 Like 'treason', 'distortions' never flourish. If intended they are offset undesired side effects of other interventions or to provide
described as allocations or interventions to redress market failure, to safety nets.
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perhaps district level) on receipt and disbursement by
spending unit and on physical out-turn. Where CF is
not the only funding source, the disbursement/physical
out-turn data reasonably requireable are for the whole
agreed programme/project not the CF component
alone. CF reporting should be within the national
accounting/reporting process and therefore should
both be uniform and compatible with the
recipient's national governmental accounting/
reporting coverage and format. Insistence on
different coverages, formats and time periods by CA
donors is a serious barrier to improving the national
system and decapacitates recipient accounting and
budgetary processes. It is this, and not multiple CF
accounts, which is the basic problem to be faced and
overcome.
Some SSA governments do not have coherent goals,
plausible budgets or accounting processes and/or have
revealed preferences in respect to additional spending
which donors are not prepared to support. In such
cases the process of integrating CA/CF into national
strategies and of untying CFs has evident limitations
and drawbacks. Capacity building assistance can allow
a start to be made if the problems are of institutional
strength, procedural design and personnel trainiñg
and/or numbers. The bottom line problem is in respect
to states whose goals CA providers decline to finance;
but in whose programmes they find some activities they
are willing to support. The problem is real but not
unique to CA/CF; nor soluble primarily in that
context.
The ue of CA/CF to facilitate implementation of
national strategies supported by donors articulated via
specific projects and programmes is impossible without
coordination. Ongoing monitoring and problem
resolution needs to be primarily recipient country
based. To be effective and/or capacitating it also needs
to be recipient led and driven, even though to a
significant extent it will need to be donor serviced and
fuelled.
These proposals are neither instantly attainable nor
'academic' or 'long term goal' in nature. Each could be
implemented to some degree now in the majority of
SSA states and all have a case for priority
implementation, in full or large measure, over five
years. Accepting and beginning to act on them now
would provide time and incentives for recipient
capacity building and supplier rethinking of procedures.
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